Introduction
Post-divorce or marriage annulment proceedings, the most vital and sensitive issues that arise are those that relate to child custody. Child custody is a term used in family law courts to define legal guardianship of a child under the age of 18. There are various personal laws and general laws that deal with matters regarding child custody in India, which include the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act of 1956, the Indian Divorce Act of 1869, and the Guardians and Wards Act of 1890. This paper aims to briefly discuss the distinctions that exist with regard to various personal laws in matters pertaining to custody of minor children. In most cases, both parents continue to share legal child custody (guardianship) but one parent gains physical child custody. Guardianship implies the proprietorial rights, and custody implies the responsibility of raising a child. Legal custody includes the rights of the parents to make decisions which affect the welfare of the child, such as medical treatments, religious practices and insurance claims. Physical child custody places the prime responsibility on parent for the childâs housing, educational needs and food. In most cases, the non-custodial parent still has visitation rights. This paper seeks to address the various considerations taken into account by courts while determining matters relating to custody. This paper further seeks to analyze the inherent gender biases in the Indian legal system regarding child custody matters.
Finally, this paper shall examine recent developments and trace the trend followed by current judgements in family law which seek to eliminate this gender bias.
Origin
The concept of custody and guardianships as enshrined in the Indian legal system can be traced to English law, specifically the Guardians and Wards act of 1890, from which the Hindu Guardianship and Minority Act is derived from. When divorce was granted statutory recognition by the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1857 in England, mothers were given independent legal recognition for the first time, as opposed to their earlier legal status being forged with their husbands upon marriage. Consequently, the concept of separated and divorced wives challenging the natural guardianship of their husbands came into public discourse. Courts in England started delivering judgements based on the principle that matrimonial litigation is not to punish the guilty but only to ensure the welfare of the child. This gave way to the concept of âwelfare of the child being paramount consideration in custodial mattersâ. This paper shall analyze in detail what constitutes âwelfareâ and the inherent gender biases which exists with regards to its interpretation.
Criteria for Determining Custody of Minor Children
The court, while exercising its parens patriae jurisdiction, takes into consideration a variety of factors in selecting a custodian. They are bound to give due importance to the childâs ordinary comfort, contentment, health, education, intellectual development, moral and ethical values, ties of affection and favourable surroundings.[1] Furthermore, the modern development of family law has deviated from the concept of treating children as mere chattel and has progressed towards a more inclusive approach, giving due importance to the preferences of the child. If the minor is old enough to form an intelligent judgement, Section 26 of the Hindu Marriage Act [2], provides for the wishes of the child to be made consistent with orders in relation to custody whenever possible. [3] Granted, the wishes of the child will be of little value if it transpires to be reflective of the wishes of one of the parents which might have been assiduously instilled into the child. Additionally, the wishes of the child are subordinate to the primary consideration, that is the âwelfare of the childâ. [4]
The factors listed out hierarchically in order of importance are [5] :
(i) welfare of the child which is of the paramount consideration
(ii) wishes of the parents
(iii) wishes of the child
(iv) age and sex of the child
Welfare of the Child
One of the most well-settled propositions in family law is to secure the childâs paramount welfare in matters relating to custody. [6] However, what constitutes âwelfareâ has had widely different interpretations. The Bombay High Court in the case of Carla Gannon v. Shabaz Farukh Allarakhia[7] held that the childâs welfare was the supreme consideration, irrespective of the rights and wrongs that the parents contend. The Supreme Court has further held that the welfare of a child is not to be measured merely by money or physical comfort, but the word welfare must be taken in its widest sense that the tie of affection cannot be disregarded. [8] However, numerous instances have evinced that the welfare of the child is not the prime consideration in all matters pertaining to custody and backward notions of stereotypical gender roles continue to pervade the Indian legal system, which shall be explored by this paper subsequently.
 Recent Developments in Custody Laws: Eliminating the Gender Bias
The Law Commission of India on 23rd May 2015, submitted its report[9] titled  âReforms in Guardianship and Custody Laws in Indiaâ, This report draws attention to childrenâs welfare being paramount in any decision relating to custody and everything else should be secondary to this consideration [10]. In interpreting welfare, it also lays out an unprecedented framework in India for awarding joint custody of the child whenever it is possible citing examples of such provisions in the applicable legal systems of various jurisdictions such as the United States, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, South Africa, Netherlands, Thailand, Singapore, and Kenya. It aims to do this by amending the Guardianship and Wards act, which currently does not provide for joint custody.
At present. Indian custody law largely ignores the concept of shared parenting, custodial disputes are reduced to ugly fights over sole custody of children, which is against the interests and welfare of the child. Cases generally conclude when the court names one of the parties as the primary guardian, leaving the other with weekly or fortnightly visitation rights.
However, besides the commisionâs recommendation, the landmark case of Vishnu Ubale vs Mrs. Archana Tushar Ubale, [11], gave shape to the concept of shared custody by denying exclusive custody of an eight-year-old girl to any one parent. Instead, Justice PL Palsingankar, on consultation with parenting experts presented a detailed shared parenting plan for the childâs upbringing. It eliminated the need for a primary guardian giving both parents equal rights over the custody of their child.
In addition to this, taking into consideration the financial stability of both parents, the court ordered that the couple to share not only the childâs custody but also her expenses. To quote exactly the views expressed by the court âThe husband did not want any contribution from the wife for maintenance [but as] both are working and earning, both should contribute to the upbringing of their daughterâ. Thus acknowledging the capabilities of a mother to provide for her child and according her position in par with the father.
 The Law Commission report aims to further the progressive outlook by seeking to eliminate the bias towards fathers from two pieces of legislature, the Hindu Minorities and Guardians Act, 1956, and the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890.
It recommends these sections, which are often used to prolong cases, be âamended to remove the superiority of one parent (father) over the other (mother), and that both father and mother be simultaneously treated as natural guardiansâ.
In English Law, there are explicit legislative provisions which prohibit preferential treatment to either parent in these matters. [12] However, there exits an inherent gender bias in Indian laws. The natural guardian of a Hindu minor is primarily the father, only after which is the mother. [13] However, in the case of a child below the age of five years, the mother is âordinarilyâ given guardianship.[14] This is because of the presumption that children of a tender age cannot manage without maternal affection. [15] Though the act specifies the term âordinarilyâ, the presumption, albeit a rebuttable one, in favor of the mother cannot be overemphasized as it can only be deviated from in the case of strong reasons.[16] Furthermore, the onus of proof lies on the father to ââŠdisclose cogent reasons that are indicative of the livelihood of the welfare and interest of the child being undermined or jeopardized if the custody is retained by the motherâ. [17]
The courts in India have consistently adopted the view laid down in Re Kamal Rudra Das J. expressed the same view vividly thus:
âI have no doubt in my mind that the motherâs lap is Godâs own cradle for a child of this age, and that as between father and mother, other things being equal, a child of such tender age should remain with mother.â [18]
Existence of a Gender Bias in Muslim Personal Law
This gender bias is not exclusive to Hindu laws, but pervades all personal laws in India. The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 [19]Â which provides for the application of Shariat law to matters relating to custody of children illustrates this in the context of Islam. [20] It provides that the foremost right to custody of minor children belongs to the mother and she cannot be deprived of her right so long as she is not found guilty of misconduct, this is recognized as the right of âhizanatâ. [21]
Hizanat establishes a rule that the mothers custodial right over the son terminates when he completes the age of 7 years and over the daughter when she attains puberty. [22] The mother cannot surrender her right to any person including her husband, the father of the child. [23]
In the case of Muhammad Tahir Vs. Raees Fatima [24], the Supreme Court disallowed the fatherâs petition for custody of the minor children and disagreed with his contention that he was allowed to take custody from the Mother because the mother was illiterate, had no source of income and that she had developed an illicit relationship with another person. The consideration of âwelfare of the childâ in custodial matters is interpreted in such a way so as to merely provide lip service to the ideal. In reality, matters related to preconceived notions of gender stereotypes have an unnecessary importance.Â
The fathers right of hizanat comes into play only after the completion of the age by the child upto which the mother or other females are entitled to custody, or in the absence of such females. [25] However, after this age, the father has an absolute right of hizanat. [26]
In Firdous Iqbal Vs. Shifaat Ali,[27] the Supreme Court set aside the order of the High Court whereby the High Court had set aside orders of the two courts below by holding âRight of the father to hold custody of his minor son was not an absolute right, but qualified by the paramount consideration for the welfare of the minor. The father was allowed to disentitle himself from custody in light of the facts and circumstances of each case, even in the instance that it is inconsistent with the welfare of the child, which is to be given paramount consideration.
However the Law Commission report[28] on Custody Laws in India is trying to reform the existing scenario. It reads:
âIt is time to give up the archaic mindset that we have adopted since the British era, to think that only one parent is better than the other parent at taking care of a child.â
Courts in India are beginning to recognize the importance of gender equality and are delivering judgements in consonance with the report. The Indian Law Commission, as early as 1989 recommended amending Section 6(a) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship act to âconstitute both the father and the mother as being natural guardians âjointly and severally,â having equal rights in respect of a minor and his property.â [29] Though this never materialized into an actuality, it is illustrative of the recognition of bias in custodial laws and the attempts made to remedy this
However, the attempt to change section 19 of the Guardians and Wards Act, 1890 to include the mother right of proprietary guardianship so as to eliminate the distinction between parents and reflect gender equality was witnessed by the 2010 amendment.
The Law Commission report of 1989 subsequently went on to address that the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 gave explicit statutory recognition to the objectionable proposition that the father is entitled to the custody of the minor child in preference to the mother. Apart from the fact that there is no rational basis for according an inferior position in the order of preference to the mother vis- Ă -vis the father, It emphasized that the proposition is vulnerable to challenge on several grounds. Firstly, disclosing a blatantly obvious anti-feminine bias. It reveals age-old distrust for women and feeling of superiority for men and inferiority for women. Whatever may have been the justification for the same in the past, assuming there was some, there is no warrant for persisting with this ancient prejudice, at least after the ushering in of the Constitution of India which proclaims the right of women to equality and guarantees non-discrimination on the ground of sex under the lofty principle enshrined in Article 15. In fact, clause (3) of Article 15, by necessary implication, gives a pre-vision of beneficial legislation geared to the special needs of women and children with a pro-women and pro-children bias. It is indeed strange that in the face of the said constitutional provision, the discrimination against 22 women has been tolerated for nearly four decades.
Further illustrations of efforts in eliminating the bias can be witnessed by landmark Supreme Court judgement in the case of Githa Hariharan v. RBI [30] which explicitly recognized gender equality as one of the basic principles of our constitution and rejected the proposition that any parent would have a preferential right of custody on such principles. The Indian legal system is moving towards the view that it does not subscribe to the concept that a particular parent is preferable for custody rights simply on the basis of gender. [31]It has done so by explicitly rejecting prior propositions that âit is the most natural thing for any child to grow up in the company of oneâs motherâ and âa child gets the best protection and education only through the mother even in natureâ.[32]
The premise that the welfare of the child is paramount has such widely contrasting interpretations, that it dilutes the entire concept. However, there have been certain positive developments in this context as well, such as the initial principle which laid down that custody should ordinarily be given to the innocent party. [33] This was overruled and currently there exists no bar in giving custody to a parent that committed the matrimonial offence that caused the divorce.[34]
Conclusion
Though, seemingly, it might appear like India is approaching a more gender neutral arena in terms of custody laws, the various aforementioned judgements are not absolute in awarding the status of custodian to the mother and are qualified by certain prerequisites. Such as, when it is mutually decided between the parents that the mother will act as the guardian where. [35] A point to consider is that only when the father has abdicated his responsibility and has consensually agreed to elevate the mother to the status of a natural guardian would such a status come into effect. Thus diluting the aim of gender equality which is sought to be achieved in such laws.
Despite the trend exhibited in recent judgements, courts are invested with a wide discretion with regards to custody matters. They may pass any order they âdeem just and properâ. Thus a true change cannot be affected without altering the mindset of the judiciary, which can only be done from the grassroots level.
References
[1] Gaurav Nagpal v. Semedha Nagpal, (2009) 1 SCC 42; Pulkit Dubey v. Â Shashank Dubey, (2016) W.P. No.19469/2015Â (M.P High Court).
[2] The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, § 26.
[3] G. Vishnudevendramma v. G. Padmaja,(2011) 4 ALL MRÂ 5; Bholaram v. Parwati Sahu, AIR 2011 CHH 38.
[4] The Guardians and Wards Act, 1890, §§ 7,17.
[5] Paras Diwan, Law of Marriage and Divorce, 770 (6th ed., 2011)Â (âParasâ).
[6] Â Ashutosh Mookerjee, Marriage Separation Divorce and Maintenance, 652 (5th ed., 2015).
[7] Carla Gannon v. Shabaz Farukh Allarakhia, Criminal Writ Petition No. 509 of 2009. (Bom. H.C.).
[8] Nil Ratan Kundu v. Abhijit Kundu, AIR 2009 SC 732.
[9] Law Commission of India, Reforms in Guardianship and Custody Laws in India, Report No.257 (May, 2015)Â (âReformsâ).
[10] Ibid.
[11] Vishnu Ubale v. Mrs. Archana Tushar Ubale, AIR 2016 Bom. H.C. 88.
[12] The Guardianship of Minors Act, 1971, § 1 (U.K.).
[13] The Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956, § 6.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Amit Choudhary, Custody of minor shall be with mother: SC , Times of India,March 4th , 2015, available at  http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Custody-of-minor-shall-be-with-mother-SC/articleshow/46450506.cms
[16] Roxann Sharma v. Arun Sharma, Civil Appeal No. 1967 Of 2015 (per Vikramajit Sen, J.).
[17] Ibid.
[18] In Re. Kamal Rudra,(1949) 2 I.L.R. 374; S. Rukmangathan v. J. Dhanalakshmi, (1998) 1 Mlj 628; Mary Vanitha v. Babu Royan, (1991) 2 Mlj 231; Mrs. Umamaheswari v. V. Sekar, AIR 1992 Mad 272.
[19] The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937, § 2.
[20] Akhtar Begum v. Jamshed Munir AIR 1979 Delhi 67.
[21] M. Hidayatullah & Arshad Hidayatullah, Mullaâs Principles of Mahomedan Law 166 (N.M. Tripathi Pvt. Ltd., Bombay, 19th edn., 1990).
[22] Ibid., (There is some dispute on the exact age amongst various sects of Muslims, The Shias hold the view that the mother is entitled to the custody of her son till he is weaned. Among the Malikis the motherâs right of hizanat over her son continues till the child has attained the age of puberty. among the Malilikis, Shafiis and the Hanabalis the motherâs right of custody over her daughters continues till they are married. Under the Ithna Ashari law the mother is entitled to the custody of her daughters till they attain the age of 7).
[23] Ameer Ali, Commentaries on Mohammedan Law 1552-1557 (Hind Publishing House, Allahabad, 2004); Zahirul Hassan v. State Of Uttar Pradesh, (1987) 1988 CriLJ 230; Mohd. Irfan v. State Of U.P, Special Appeal No.1015 of 2014 ( All. H.C.).
[24] Muhammad Tahir v. Raees Fatima, 2003 SCMR 1344.
[25] Furqan Ahmad, Muslim Law, 49 Annual Survey of Indian Law 877 (2013).
[26] Nighat Firdous v. Khadim Hussain, 1998 SCMR 1593.
[27] Firdous Iqbal v. Shifaat Ali, 2000 SCMR 83.
[28] Reforms, supra note 9.
[29] Law Commission of India, Removal of discrimination against Women in matters relating to Guardianship and Custody of Minor Children and Elaboration of the Welfare Principle, Report No. 133, ¶ 4.3 (August, 1989), available at: http://lawcommissionofindia.nic.in/101-169/Report133.pdf.
[30] Ms. Githa Hariharan & Anr vs Reserve Bank Of India & Anr, AIR 1999Â SC 1149.
[31] Kumar V. Jahgirdar v. Chethana Ramatheertha, AIR 2004 SC 1525.
[32] Chethana Ramatheertha v. Kumar V. Jahgirdar, (2003) 3 KarLJ 530.
[33] W.G Mayhew v. Sarah Anna Mayhew, 9 ILR 293.
[34] Paras, supra note 5,760.
[35] Supra note 30.